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Abstract
Bid opening in sealed-bid e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic encryption algorithm
is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic bid opening is employed to open the bids. Such
e-auction schemes are called homomorphic auctions. However, high efficiency of homomorphic
auctions is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g. within a special range). An
undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately,
in most existing homomorphic auction schemes, proof and verification of validity of the bids
is either ignored or too inefficient. Recently, a technique called batched bid validity check [25]
is proposed to improve efficiency of proof and verification of bid validity in a special kind of
homomorphic auction schemes: secret-sharing-based homomorphic auctions. However, secret-
sharing-based homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15] are not a main stream in homomorphic
auction schemes as they employ threshold secret sharing techniques to seal the bids. Main stream
homomorphic auction schemes employ a homomorphic encryption algorithm with threshold
distributed decryption to seal the bids as it is simpler and more efficient than secret sharing.
In this paper, an ElGamal-encryption-based homomorphic encryption scheme is proposed. It
employs a batched proof and verification of bid validity to achieve high efficiency in bid validity
check. Its batch proof and verification technique is more advanced than that in [25], so it is
simpler and more efficient than the homomorphic auction scheme in [25].
1 Introduction
In a sealed-bid auction scheme, each bidder chooses his evaluation from a number of biddable prices
and submits it to some auctioneers before a deadline. After the deadline, the auctioneers open the
bids and determine the winning price and winner(s) according to a pre-defined auction rule. The
commonly applied auction rules include first bid auction (the bidder with the highest bid wins and
pays the highest bid), Vickrey auction (the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the second
highest bid) and the ρth bid auction (the bidders with the ρ−1 highest bids win, pay the ρth highest
bid and each get an identical item). The first-bid auction and Vickrey auction can be regarded as
special cases of the ρth bid auction, which is a general solution. An auction must be correct, namely
the auction result is strictly determined according to the auction rule. Fairness is necessary in any
auction such that every bidder is equally treated and no bidder can take advantage over other
bidders. Usually, bid privacy must be kept in a sealed-bid auction scheme, which requires that in
the course of bid opening no bid is revealed. Robustness is also desired in auction schemes, which
requires that even in abnormal situations, correct auction result can be obtained after running the
auction protocol. In addition, a sealed-bid auction scheme should be flexible and support various
auction rules.
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When bid privacy must be kept in a non-interactive sealed-bid e-auction1, the most efficient
bid opening function is homomorphic bid opening [13, 15, 1, 19, 26, 24, 23]. To adopt this bid
opening function, one-selection-per-price principle must be employed. Each bidder has to submit a
bidding selection at every biddable price to indicate whether he is willing to pay that price (“YES”
or “NO”). Every selection is sealed with a homomorphic sealing function, so that the auctioneers
can exploit its homomorphism to test whether the number of bidders willing to pay a price is over
ρ without revealing any bidding selection. When this homomorphic bid opening mechanism is
applied together with binary search strategy, the winning bid can be determined very efficiently.
The sealed-bid e-auction schemes employing homomorphic bid opening [13, 15, 1, 19, 26, 24, 23]
is called homomorphic auction schemes in this paper. There are two kinds of homomorphic auction
schemes according to the bid sealing function. The first one [13, 15, 24] employs homomorphic
threshold secret sharing to seal the bids. Every bidder shares each of his bidding selections using a
homomorphic threshold secret sharing algorithm (e.g.[22]) among the auctioneers, who can apply
homomorphic threshold secret reconstruction to bid opening. The other [1, 19, 26, 23] employs
homomorphic encryption algorithms with threshold distributed decryption to seal the bids. Every
bidder encrypts each of his bidding selections with a homomorphic encryption algorithm (e.g.
ElGamal encryption or Paillier encryption [20]) while the corresponding private (decryption) key
is shared among the auctioneers to enable a threshold decryption. The auctioneers apply threshold
distributed decryption to bid opening. Obviously, the latter is simpler and more efficient in both
computation and communication. Firstly, for each bidding selection in a bid, multiple instances
of secret sharing (bid sharing) are needed in the former while only one instance of secret sharing
(key sharing) is needed in the latter. Secondly, for each bidding selection in his bid, a bidder has
to submit multiple encrypted and signed shares to the auctioneers in the former while he has to
submit only one encrypted and signed value to the auctioneers in the latter.
In homomorphic auction schemes, each bidding selection is only valid when it is either “YES”
or “NO”. As shown in [25] invalid bidding selections (neither “YES” nor “NO”) may compromise
correctness and fairness of the auction. So validity of the bids must be guaranteed in all the
homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15, 1, 19, 26, 24, 23]. In most existing homomorphic auction
schemes [13, 15, 26, 1, 19], one integer (usually 0) is chosen to stands for “NO” in a bidding
selection and another integer (usually 1) is chosen to stands for “YES” in a bidding selection.
In these schemes proved validity of the bids must be proved by the bidders and verified by the
auctioneers and independent observers. In a publicly verifiable auction scheme, the proof must
be publicly verifiable. However, proof and verification of bid validity in them is either ignored
[13, 15, 26] or inefficient [1, 19].
In [24, 23], all the integers in the domain of the sealing function (either secret sharing or
encryption) are divided into two subsets. Any integer in one subset stands for “YES” and any
integer in the other subset stands for“NO”. Thus, in these two schemes there is no invalid bidding
selection and no bidder has to prove validity of his bid. However, these two schemes have their
own drawbacks. They only support first bid auction, so are not flexible. Moreover, they need more
complicated bid opening.
So, there is a problem in homomorphic auction: correctness, fairness, robustness, flexibility and
high efficiency cannot be simultaneously guaranteed. To achieve correctness and fairness, either
flexibility and robustness is sacrificed (in [24, 23]) or costly bid validity check must be employed
1An auction is non-interactive if no communication between the bidders and the auctioneers is needed after the bids
are submitted in a one-round submission. Non-interactive sealed-bid e-auction is popular as most bidders choosing
sealed-bid auction instead of open-cry auction do not want to keep on-line and communicate with the auctioneers
repeatedly.
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(in [13, 15, 1, 19, 26]). If this problem is not solved, the advantage of homomorphic auction over
other sealed-bid auction solutions [18, 12, 11, 8, 4, 16, 29, 30, 31, 28] is dubious.
A batched proof and verification technique is used in [25] to solve this problem. It permits
a bidder to prove validity of all the bidding selections in his bid in a batch while a verifier can
verify his proof in a batch as well. The batched proof and verification are much more efficient
than the multiple instances of proof and verification. However, batched proof and verification of
bid validity in [25] can only be applied to secret-sharing based homomorphic auction. It does not
address simpler, more efficient and popular encryption-based homomorphic auction.
A new homomorphic auction scheme is proposed in this paper to fill the gap. More advanced
batched proof and verification of bid validity than that in [25] is designed to batch prove and verify
validity of bids in encryption-based homomorphic auction. Firstly, a ElGamal-based homomorphic
sealed-bid auction scheme with normal inefficient bid validity check is proposed as a prototype.
Then its bid validity check mechanism is optimised using the new batched proof and verification
technique. It improves efficiency of encryption-based homomorphic auction compared to [1, 19, 26],
but does not have the drawbacks of [24, 23].
2 Symbols and Parameters
The following symbols and parameters will be used in this paper.
• Suppose there are n bidders B1, B2, . . . , Bn and w biddable prices p1, p2, . . . , pw from the
highest to the lowest.
• E() denotes encryption; D() denotes decryption.
• 〈x〉: the bit length of integer x.
• Two large primes p and q are chosen, such that p = 2q+1 and w < q. Integer g0 is a generator
of Z∗p . Integers g and h are generators of G, the subgroup of Z∗p with order q.
• Unless specified, all the multiplication calculations in this paper is modulo p.
• Definition 1 | | is the absolute-value function from Z∗p to G defined as
|σ| =
{
σ if σ ∈ G
gq0σ if σ ∈ Z∗p \G
• Let L be a security parameter such that 2L < q.
3 Background
Homomorphic auction and a cryptographic tool to be employed later, batch proof and verification,
are introduced in this section.
3.1 Homomorphic Auction and Bid Validity Check
The idea of homomorphic auction is simple: to exploit homomorphism of a bid sealing function to
implement efficient bid opening while no bid is revealed. We abstract, supplement and summarize
the existing ρth bid homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15, 1, 19, 26] as follows where unlike in [25]
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both secret-sharing based schemes and encryption-based schemes are taken into account. Suppose
S() is a sealing function and a message m is sealed into c = S(m). S() must be additive homo-
morphic, namely S(m1)S(m2) = S(m1 + m2) and S(m)t = S(tm) for any messages m, m1, m2
and any integer t. As stated in Section 1, one-selection-per-price principle is employed and every
bidder has to make a choice at every biddable price. Suppose the bidding selections at a price are
m1,m2, . . . ,mn where mi is the selection of Bi. mi = 1 implies that Pi is willing to pay this price;
mi = 0 implies that Pi is unwilling to pay this price. Bid opening at this price is described as
follows.
1. The unsealing power (trap-door) is shared by multiple auctioneers such that bid opening is
feasible if and only if the number of cooperating auctioneers is over a pre-defined threshold.
2. mi is sealed into ci = S(mi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n when being submitted.
3. The auctioneers cooperate to unseal (
∏n
i=1 ci)
t0 , ((
∏n
i=1 ci)/S(1))
t1 , . . . ((
∏n
i=1 ci)/S(ρ −
1))tρ−1 after randomly shuffling them where tj for j = 0, 1, . . . , ρ − 1 are secret random
integers corporately chosen and shared by the auctioneers. If any of the unsealed results is
zero, the number of non-zero selections is smaller than ρ at this price. If all the unsealed
results are non-zero, the number of non-zero selections is at least ρ at this price.
Binary search can be employed to search for the winning price among the biddable prices. If the
number of non-zero selections is found to be smaller than ρ at the currently searched price, the
search goes on to lower prices; if the number of non-zero selections is at least ρ at the currently
searched price, the search goes on to higher prices. The winning price can be found after bid opening
is performed at about 〈w〉 prices, while no bid is unsealed. Note that binary search requires that
the bidding selections in a bid must be consistent, namely non-zero selections must be at lower
prices than zero selections in a bid. If the sealing function is a one-way trap-door function, no bid
is revealed. This idea is generally adopted by most homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15, 1, 19, 26]
although most of them simplify bid opening at Step 3 by directly unsealing
∏n
i=1 ci, which sacrifices
complete bid privacy for higher efficiency.
Peng et al [25] illustrate that in homomorphic auction bid validity check is necessary for correct-
ness and fairness of the auction by presenting an attack using invalid bids to compromise correctness
and fairness in homomorphic auction. Their viewpoint is correct in general as [23] and [24] are very
special homomorphic auction schemes. Although homomorphic auction schemes in [23] and [24] do
not need bid validity check, they have three drawbacks: 1)they only supports first bid auction and
cannot be extended to other auction rules; 2)they employ more complicated bid opening function
than the traditional homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15, 1, 19, 26]; 3)robustness may be compro-
mised when binary search is employed as inconsistent bidding selections (non-zero selections are at
higher prices than zero selections in a bid) cannot be detected. Although their efficiency trade-off
(saving the cost of bid validity check at the cost of complicated bid opening) is successful and these
two schemes are more efficient than the traditional homomorphic auction schemes [13, 15, 1, 19, 26],
they lack flexibility and robustness.
In the new auction scheme in this paper, ElGamal encryption is employed while 0 and 1 are
used to stand for “YES”’ and “NO” in a bid selection. To achieve flexibility and robustness, bid
validity check is needed to guarantee that the correct format is used in every bid selection. As
binary search is employed in the new auction scheme in this paper, bid validity also requires that
the bidding selections in any bid must be consistent. However, we need a new bid validity check
mechanism more efficient than the existing one. The existing bid validity check mechanism in
[1, 19] employs zero knowledge proof of partial knowledge by Cramer et al [7] to prove and verify
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bid validity, which has a high cost: O(w) full-length exponentiations for each bidder’s proof and
O(nw) full-length exponentiations for any verifier (e.g. each auctioneer). Although the batched bid
validity check in [25] is efficient, it cannot be applied to the new scheme. The batched bid validity
check in [25] only supports secret-sharing-based homomorphic auction, while ElGamal encryption
(bid sealing by which is simpler and more efficient than that by secret sharing) is employed in the
new scheme to seal the bids.
3.2 1-out-of-w Oblivious Transfer
A 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol is needed in this paper. In our application only one
value is transferred using the 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol, so the 1-out-of-w oblivious
transfer protocol is performed only once and security requirement for multiple transfers need not
be considered. However, the employed 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol must be very efficient
to achieve high efficiency. So the 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer in [25] is employed, which is based
on RSA encryption and the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol in [12]. This 1-out-of-w oblivious
transfer protocol only provides one-time security, but is very efficient.
The sender has w secrets s1, s2, . . . sw and the chooser wants to know sδ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , w}. They
run the following protocol where the chooser’s operation is denoted as OT1(sδ) and the sender’s
operation is denoted as OT2(sδ).
1. Initialisation: The sender sets up RSA encryption, keeps private key d and publishes
public key e and N ′ where ed = 1 mod φ(N ′). He randomly selects ei,j from ZN ′ for
i = 1, 2, . . . , log2w and j = 0, 1 and publishes s′l = sl −
∏log2 w
i=1 ei,bl,i mod N
′ for l = 1, 2, . . . w
where bl,i denotes the ith bit of l. He chooses randomly ci ∈ ZN ′ for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w and
sends them to the chooser.
2. OT1: choosing a secret
The chooser chooses secrets τi ∈ N ′ for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w. He calculates public keys yi,bδ,i =
τ ei mod N
′ for i = 1, 2, . . . , log2w. Then he calculates yi,1⊕bδ,i = yi,bδ,ici mod N
′ if bδ,i = 0
or yi,1⊕bδ,i = yi,bδ,i/ci mod N
′ if bδ,i = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w where ⊕ stands for XOR. He
sends yi,0 and yi,1 for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w to the sender in correct order.
3. OT2: sending the secret
The sender verifies yi,1 = ciyi,0 mod N ′ for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w and sends Ei,0 = ydi,0ei,0 mod N ′
and Ei,1 = ydi,1ei,1 mod N
′ for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w to the chooser.
4. Obtaining the secret: The chooser can only get sδ = s′δ+(
∏log2 w
i=1 Ei,bδ,i)/
∏log2 w
i=1 τi mod N
′.
The following properties of this 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol are demonstrated in [25].
1. Correctness: If the sender and the chooser follow the protocol, the chooser can obtain sδ as
s′δ + (
∏log2 w
i=1 Ei,bδ,i)/
∏log2 w
i=1 τi = s
′
δ + (
∏log2 w
i=1 y
d
i,bδ,i
ei,bδ,i)/
∏log2 w
i=1 τi
= s′δ + (
∏log2 w
i=1 y
d
i,bδ,i
ei,bδ,i)/
∏log2 w
i=1 τi = s
′
δ + (
∏log2 w
i=1 τ
ed
i ei,bδ,i)/
∏log2 w
i=1 τi
= s′δ +
∏log2 w
i=1 ei,bδ,i = sδ mod N
′
2. Privacy of the chooser: As yi,0 and yi,1 for i = 1, 2, . . . log2w are distributed uniformly,
the sender has no knowledge of δ. Namely, information-theoretic privacy of the chooser is
achieved.
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3. Privacy of the sender: It is widely believed that composite factorization is intractable and
without the knowledge of the factorization of n it is intractable to find d given e and n. So
the chooser can get only one of ei,0 and ei,1 for every i in [1, log2w]. Therefore, the chooser
does not know any other secret than sδ.
4. High efficiency:
• the cost to the sender is 2 log2w exponentiations and n(log2w − 1) + 2 log2w multipli-
cations;
• the cost to the chooser is (log2w)/2 + 1 divisions and 1.5 log2w + 1 multiplications on
average if e is a small integer as suggested in [12].
In this paper, this 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol will be applied to transfer an L-bit integer
where N ′ > 2L.
3.3 Batch Proof and Verification of Equality of Logarithms
Batch verification was first described formally and in detail by Bellare, who proposed three pro-
tocols: RS (random subset) test, SE (small exponent) test and Bucket test [2]. Bellare’s batch
verification techniques are used to improve efficiency of verification of multiple common base ex-
ponentiations. Bellare’s tests are only sound when certain integers involved in the verification are
in a special subgroup. It is illustrated in [3] that as membership test in the special subgroup is
inefficient, Bellare’s techniques cannot improve efficiency in the application he proposed. Batch
verification is extended to batch zero knowledge proof and verification of secret knowledge state-
ments in [27], which also solves the membership test problem. Theorem 1 is proposed in [27] to
batch prove and verify equality of logarithms without need of membership test: logg |yi| = logh |zi|
where yi ∈ Z∗p and zi ∈ Z∗p for i = 1, 2, . . . , w.
Theorem 1 Suppose yi ∈ Z∗p and zi ∈ Z∗p for i = 1, 2, . . . , w. Let ti for i = 1, 2, . . . , w be random
integers such that ti < 2L . If logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i with a probability larger than 2
−L, then
logg |yi| = logh |zi| for i = 1, 2, . . . , w.
The proof of Theorem 1 in [27] is generally correct but ambiguous in a couple of details.
So a better proof is provided in Appendix A for it. According to Theorem 1, proof and ver-
ification of logg1 |yi| = logg2 |zi| for i = 1, 2, . . . , w can be batched to proof and verification of
logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i when t1, t2, . . . , tn are randomly chosen. If logg1 |yi| 6= logg2 |zi| for any
i in {1, 2, . . . , w}, logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i with only negligible probability.
4 Prototype of the New Scheme
As mentioned before, in homomorphic auction encryption-based bid sealing is simpler and more
efficient than secret-sharing-based bid sealing. So in the new homomorphic auction scheme em-
ploys encryption-based bid sealing. As sharing the private key of Paillier encryption among the
auctioneers without revealing it to any single party (including trusted third party) is very complex
and impractical, ElGamal encryption instead of Paillier encryption often employed in the existing
encryption-based homomorphic auction schemes is employed in the new auction scheme in this
paper. As shown later in this section, sharing the private key of ElGamal encryption among the
auctioneers without revealing it to any single party is quite simple and efficient. Although ElGamal
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encryption is not additive homomorphic as required in the existing encryption-based homomorphic
auction schemes, efficient homomorphic bid opening is implemented based on it in the new scheme.
Suppose there are m auctioneers A1, A2, . . . , Am. The prototype auction protocol is as follows.
1. Each auctioneer Aj chooses his private key xj from Zq for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Each Aj publishes
yj = gxj and shares his key among the auctioneers using a t-out-of-m secret sharing technique
(e.g. [21]). Each auctioneer sums up his shares from all the auctioneers and get his share of
the decryption key, which is x =
∑m
j=1 xj mod q. The public key is y =
∏m
j=1 yj mod p. A
message s is encrypted into (gr mod p, syr mod p) where r is randomly chosen from Zq and
a ciphertext c = (a, b) is decrypted into b/
∏t
j=1 sj mod p where sj = a
xj mod p is provided
by Aj and for simplicity A1, A2, . . . , At are supposed to be t honest auctioneers. Aj can
demonstrate validity of sj by proving logg yj = loga sj .
2. Each bidder Bi chooses his bid bi from {1, 2, . . . , w} and builds his bidding vector
(mi,1,mi,2, . . . ,mi,w) where mi,bi = 1 and all the other components are zeros.
3. Each Bi uses ElGamal encryption to encrypt (gmi,1 , gmi,2 , . . . , gmi,w) into (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,w)
where ci,l = (ai,l, bi,l) = (gsi,l mod p, gmi,lysi,l mod p) and si,l is randomly chosen from Zq
for l = 1, 2, . . . , w.
4. Each Bi proves
logg
∏w
l=1 ai,l = logy((
∏w
l=1 bi,l)/g) (1)
using ZK proof of equality of logarithms [5] and
logg ai,l = logy bi,l ∨ logg ai,l = logy(bi,l/g) for l = 1, 2, . . . , w (2)
by repeating for l = 1, 2, . . . , w the proof protocol in Figure 1, which is a combination of ZK
proof of equality of logarithms [5] and ZK proof of partial knowledge [7].
5. c′i,l = (a
′
i,l, b
′
i,l) = (
∏l
k=1 ai,k mod p,
∏l
k=1 bi,k mod p) are calculated for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and
l = 1, 2, . . . , w. This operation transforms the bids into the one-selection-per-price format, so
that a binary search can be performed.
6. The auctioneers perform a binary search for the winning price. At each price pl on the binary
search route, t honest auctioneers among A1, A2, . . . , Am cooperate to decrypt
((
∏n
i=1 a
′
i,l)
rl,0 mod p, (
∏n
i=1 b
′
i,l)
rl,0 mod p)
((
∏n
i=1 a
′
i,l)
rl,1 mod p, ((
∏n
i=1 b
′
i,l)/g)
rl,1 mod p)
((
∏n
i=1 a
′
i,l)
rl,2 mod p, ((
∏n
i=1 b
′
i,l)/g
2)rl,2 mod p) . . .
((
∏n
i=1 a
′
i,l)
rl,ρ−1 mod p, ((
∏n
i=1 b
′
i,l)/g
ρ−1)rl,ρ−1 mod p)
after re-encrypting and shuffling them (e.g. using the publicly verifiable shuffling scheme in
[10]). After the decryption, each Aj proves that his partial decryption is correct. If any of
the decryption result is zero, the search goes on to lower prices; if all the decrypted results
are non-zero, the search goes on to higher prices. After visiting 〈w〉 prices, the binary search
stops at the winning price.
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7. All the selections at the price just higher than the winning price (in the case of first bid
auction, all the selections at the winning price) are decrypted by the auctioneers while each
participating auctioneer proves that his partial decryption is correct. All the bidders with a
non-zero selection at that price are winners.
It is easy to check that if a bidder’s bid is valid, he can always successfully prove (1) and (2).
Soundness of ZK proof of equality of logarithms [5] and ZK proof of partial knowledge [7] guarantee
that when the number of biddable prices is smaller than q (which is always satisfied in practice)
with an overwhelmingly large probability a bid is valid if the bidder’s proof of (1) and (2) can pass
public verification. Honest verifier zero knowledge property of ZK proof of equality of logarithms
[5] and ZK proof of partial knowledge [7] guarantee that no bid is revealed in this bid validity check
mechanism. In this prototype, bid opening is efficient compared to bid validity check and only costs
each auctioneer O(n) full-length exponentiations. Each bidder costs 2w full-length exponentiations
in bid encryption, which is acceptable. However, bid validity check is too inefficient. Although
proof and verification of (1) is efficient, the proof and verification of (2) in Figure 1 costs a bidder
much higher cost than bid encryption and a verifier at least O(wn) full-length exponentiations.
This is a very high cost and an efficiency bottleneck of the auctions scheme.
To prove logg ai,l = logy bi,l ∨ logg ai,l = logy(bi,l/g)
where logg ai,l = logy(bi,l/gk) = θ and k = 0 or 1
1. Bi publishes α0, β0, α1 and β1 where
α1−k = gv1−ka
u1−k
i,l mod p
β1−k = yv1−k(bi,l/g1−k)u1−k mod p
αk = gr mod p
βk = yr mod p
and r, u1−k, v1−k are randomly chosen from Zq.
2. A verifier (e.g. acted by the auctioneers corporately) publishes a random integer u.
3. Bi publishes u1, u2, v1 and v2 where
uk = u− u1−k mod q
vk = r − ukθ mod q
Public verification:
α0 = gv0au0i,l mod p
β0 = yv0bu0i,l mod p
α1 = gv1au1i,l mod p
β1 = yv1(bi,l/g)u1 mod p
u = u0 + u1 mod q
Figure 1: Normal method to prove (2)
8
5 Efficiency Optimisation
As shown in last section, the prototype is too inefficient. Its cost for a bidder’s proof and an
auctioneer’s verification in bid validity check is too high. An efficiency optimisation is proposed
in this section. To apply batch proof and verification to improve efficiency, two modifications are
made to the prototype.
• The format of the bidding vector is slightly changed. mi,l is encrypted into (ai,l, bi,l) =
(µgri,l mod p, νgmi,lyri,l mod p) where Bi randomly chooses ri,l ∈ Zq, µ = 1 or gq0 mod p and
ν = 1 or gq0 mod p.
• Proof and verification of (2) in the prototype is optimised using batch proof-verification
techniques and 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer. An optimised proof and verification protocol
for (2) is described in Figure 2 where mi,δ = 1 and mi,l = 0 for l = 1, 2, . . . , δ−1, δ+1, . . . , w.
According to Theorem 1 and the privacy property for the sender in the 1-out-of-w oblivious
transfer in Section 3.2, the protocol in Figure 2 proves
logg |ai,l| = logy |bi,l| for w − 1 instances of l where l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , w}
without revealing the bid.
• The decryption function is modified: a ciphertext c = (a, b) is decrypted into
|b/∏tj=1 sj mod p| where sj = axj mod p is provided by Aj .
The other operations in the prototype are not changed. This new bid valid check in addition to
Proof of (1), guarantees that
• |D(ci,l)| = 1 for w − 1 cases of l in {1, 2, . . . , w};
• |D(ci,l)| = g for 1 case of l in {1, 2, . . . , w}.
Bi → Auctioneers : OT1(tδ)
Auctioneers→ Bi : OT2(tδ)
Bi → Auctioneers : α = gr mod p, β = yrgtδ mod p where r is randomly chosen from Zq.
Auctioneers→ Bi : t1, t2, . . . , tw where tl ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} for l = 1, 2, . . . , w.
Bi → Auctioneers : z = s− r mod q where s = ∑wl=1 ri,ltl mod q
Verification:
∏w
l=1 a
tl
i,l = αg
z mod p,
∏w
l=1 b
tl
i,l = βy
z mod p
Figure 2: Batched Proof and Verification of Bid Validity
6 Analysis
Security of the proposed auction scheme, especially its bid validity check mechanism, is analysed
in this section. Theorem 2 together with the privacy property of the 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer
protocol proved in [25] guarantees that the proof protocol in Figure 2 is private.
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Theorem 2 The last three steps in the proof protocol in Figure 2 are honest-verifier zero knowledge.
Proof: A party without any secret knowledge can simulate (α, β, t1, t2, . . . , tw, z), the proof tran-
script for the last three steps, as follows.
1. Randomly choose integers z from Zq and t1, t2, . . . , tw from {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1}.
2. Calculates α = (
∏w
l=1 a
tl
i,l)/g
z mod p and β = (
∏w
l=1 b
tl
i,l)/y
z mod p.
If the challenges are randomly chosen in the proof protocol in Figure 2, then in both the simulated
transcript and the proof transcript in Figure 2, α, β are uniformly distributed in Z∗p , t1, t2, . . . , tw
are uniformly distributed in {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} and z is uniformly distributed in Zq. Therefore, the
two transcripts have the same distribution and are indistinguishable. 2
Theorem 3 The proof protocol in Figure 2 is specially sound. More precisely, if in Figure 2
the challenges are randomly chosen and the proof passes the verification with a probability no
smaller than 2−wL + 2−L, the proof together with (1) guarantees that (g, 1, 1 . . . , 1) is encrypted
in ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,w after being permuted.
To prove Theorem 3, the following two lemmas are proved first.
Lemma 1 If a prover can pass the protocol in either Figure 3 or Figure 2, then he can pass the
other as well.
Proof: As the oblivious transfer protocol guarantees privacy of sender, in the protocol in Figure 2 the
prover only gets tδ in the first two steps and gets no information about t1, t2, . . . , tδ−1, tδ+1, . . . , tw
until the fourth step. So in both the protocols in Figure 2 and Figure 3 the prover tries to prove
the same statement while given the same knowledge. Therefore, he can pass the other as well if
he can pass one of them. 2
Bi → Auctioneers : δ
Auctioneers→ Bi : tδ,
Bi → Auctioneers : α = gr mod p, β = yrgtδ mod p where r is randomly chosen from Zq.
Auctioneers→ Bi : t1, t2, . . . , tw where tl ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} for l = 1, 2, . . . , w.
Bi → Auctioneers : z = s− r mod q where s = ∑wl=1 ri,ltl mod q
Verification:
∏w
l=1 a
tl
i,l = αg
z mod p,
∏w
l=1 b
tl
i,l = βy
z mod p
Figure 3: A protocol used in proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 2 The protocol in Figure 3 is specially sound. More precisely, if in Figure 3 the challenges
are randomly chosen and the prover can pass the verification with a probability no smaller than
2−wL + 2−L, then logg |ai,l| = logy |bi,l| for l = 1, 2, . . . , δ − 1, δ + 1, . . . , w.
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Proof: As the prover can pass the verification in the protocol in Figure 3 with a probability larger
than 2−wL+2−L, the prover must be able to give two responses z and z′ to two different challenges
t1, t2, . . . , tδ−1, tδ+1, . . . , tw and t′1, t′2, . . . , t′δ−1, t
′
δ+1, . . . , t
′
w to the same commitment a and the same
tδ, such that ∏w
l=1 a
tl
i,l = αg
z mod p (3)∏w
l=1 b
tl
i,l = βy
z mod p (4)
(
∏δ−1
l=1 a
t′l
i,l)a
tδ
i,δ
∏w
l=δ+1 a
t′l
i,l = αg
z′ mod p (5)
(
∏δ−1
l=1 b
t′l
i,l)b
tδ
i,δ
∏w
l=δ+1 b
t′l
i,l = βy
z′ mod p (6)
with a probability larger than 2−L. Otherwise, the prover can give correct response to at most one
challenge with a probability larger than 2−L. This deduction implies when a random challenge is
raised the probability that the prover can pass the verification is no more than
0× P (E0) + p1P (E1) + p2P (E2)
where p1 is a probability larger than 2−L, p2 is a probability no larger than 2−L, E0 denotes the
event that the prover can give correct response to zero challenge with a probability larger than 2−L,
E1 denotes the event that the prover can give correct response to one challenge with a probability
larger than 2−L and that challenge happens to be chosen, E2 denotes the event that the prover can
give correct response to one challenge with a probability larger than 2−L and that challenge is not
chosen. As
0× P (E0) + p1P (E1) + p2P (E2) = p12−wL + p2(1− 2−wL) < 2−wL + 2−L
there is a contradiction to the assumption that the prover can pass the verification in the protocol
in Figure 3 with a probability larger than 2−wL + 2−L.
Dividing (3) with (5) yields ∏
1≤l≤w,l 6=δ a
tl−t′l
i,l = g
z−z′ mod p
and dividing (4) with (6) yields ∏
1≤l≤w,l 6=δ b
tl−t′l
i,l = y
z−z′ mod p
both of which are correct with a probability larger than 2−L. So logg
∏
1≤l≤w,l 6=δ a
tl−t′l
i,l =
logy
∏
1≤l≤w,l 6=δ b
tl−t′l
i,l with a probability larger than 2
−L.
As the challenges t1, t2, . . . , tδ−1, tδ+1, . . . , tw and t′1, t′2, . . . , t′δ−1, t
′
δ+1, . . . , t
′
w are randomly cho-
sen, t1− t′1, t2− t′2, . . . , tδ−1− t′δ−1, tδ+1− t′δ+1, . . . , tw− t′w are random. So according to Theorem 1,
logg |ai,l| = logy |bi,l| for l = 1, 2, . . . , δ − 1, δ + 1, . . . , w.
2
Proof of Theorem 3: According to Lemma 1, if the proof protocol in Figure 2 passes the verification
with a probability no smaller than 2−wL+2−L when the challenges are random, the prover can also
give a proof and pass the verification in Figure 3 with the same probability when the challenges
are random.
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So according to Lemma 2, ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,δ−1, ci,δ+1 . . . , ci,w encrypt 1. Proof (1) guarantees
that
∏w
l=1D(ci,l) = D(
∏w
i=1 ci,l) = g. So ci,δ encrypts g. Therefore, (g, 1, 1 . . . , 1) is encrypted in
ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,w after being permuted. 2
Comparison of computational cost between the existing non-interactive auction schemes with bid
privacy and the new auction scheme is made in Table 1 where multiplications are counted. Auction
schemes in [29, 30] are not included as they require O(w) rounds of interactive communication
between the bidders and auctioneers, so are not practical. The auction schemes in [9, 31, 17] are
not included as they do not (or at least do not strictly) protect bid privacy. Any full-length integer
is assumed to be 1024 bits long. An exponentiation with an x-bit exponent is regarded as 1.5x
multiplications and product of y exponentiations with x-bit exponents is regarded as x + 0.5xy
multiplications. In [23], T1 and T2 are length of challenges and cutting factor in cut-and-choose
mechanism. In [24], t is the sharing threshold in the secret sharing mechanism used to share the
bids among the auctioneers. An example of the efficiency comparison is also given in the table,
where n = 1000, w = 4096, m = 5, T1 = T2 = 20, t = 3 and L = 20. It is clearly illustrated that
the new scheme is more efficient than any flexible and robust non-interactive sealed-bid auction
scheme with bid privacy.
Table 1: Efficiency comparison of non-interactive auction schemes with bid privacy
Auction Flexi- Robust- Bidder Auctioneer
scheme -bility -ness multiplication example multiplication example
[18, 12, 11, 8, 4, 16] Yes Yes ≥ 3072 log2 w + 1536 ≥ 38400 ≥ 337920n log2 w ≥ 4055040000
[28] Yes Yes ≥ (1.5w + 1)1536+ ≥ 11492329 ≥ (0.5w(n + 3) + 1)1536+ ≥ 3158751721
n(0.5L + 1) + 4609 2304n + n(0.5L + 1) + 1
[13, 15, 6, 14, 1, 19] Yes Yes ≥ 12291.5w + 1536 ≥ 50346140 ≥ 12292nw + (10752 + 2n) log2 L ≥ 50348957633
with bid validity check +1536(0.5n + 2) + 1537
average ((0.5n + 1)m(T1 + T2)
[23] No No 1.5w + 1536 7680 +(1.5m + 0.125n− 1)T1T2+ 2338021
1.25nT2 + 0.5T1 + 1) log2 w+
1536(1 + (0.5T1 + 1) log2 w) + 1
[24] No No ≥ (w(2m + t + 3) + 1) ≥ 69207552 ≥ 1536(5n + 5 log2 w + 1) ≥ 7773696
1536
[25] Yes Yes t(0.5wL + 3w + L+ 218994 n((3025 + 1047t) log2 w + 2L + wL 219000024
750 log2 w + 10730) +w log2 w + 14112) + 4502 log2 w
New scheme Yes Yes 0.5wL + 3w + L+ 73257 n(3074 log2 w + 2L + wL+ 181683296
769.5 log2 w + 10755 w log2 w + 13828) + 4608 log2 w
7 Conclusion
A correct, fair, private and robust homomorphic sealed-bid auction scheme is proposed. It employs
ElGamal encryption and an original batched bid validity check mechanism to achieve high efficiency
without compromising flexibility and robustness. The new scheme is more efficient than any flexible
and robust non-interactive sealed-bid auction scheme with bid privacy.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1: logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i with a probability larger than 2
−L implies that for
any given integer v in {1, 2, . . . , w} there must exist integers t1, t2, . . . , tw and t′v in {0, 1, . . . , 2L−1}
such that
logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i (7)
logg((
∏v−1
i=1 y
ti
i )y
t′v
v
∏w
i=v+1 y
ti
i ) = logh((
∏v−1
i=1 z
ti
i )z
t′v
v
∏w
i=v+1 z
ti
i ) (8)
Otherwise, for any (t1, t2, . . . , tv−1, tv+1, . . . , tw), there is at most one tv to satisfy logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i =
logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i . This implies that among the 2
wL possible choices for (t1, t2, . . . , tw) (combination
of 2(w−1)L possible choices for (t1, t2, . . . , tv−1, tv+1, . . . , tw) and 2L possible choices for tv) there
is at most 2(w−1)L choices to satisfy logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i , which is a contradiction to the
assumption that logg
∏w
i=1 y
ti
i = logh
∏w
i=1 z
ti
i with a probability larger than 2
−L.
(7) divided by (8) yields
logg y
tv−t′v
v = logh z
tv−t′v
v
Namely
(tv − t′v) logg |yv| = (tv − t′v) logh |zv| mod q
Note that tv 6= t′v and tv, t′v < 2L < q. So tv − t′v 6= 0 mod q and
logg |yv| = logh |zv|
Therefore, logg |yi| = logh |zi| for i = 1, 2, . . . , w as v can be any integer in {1, 2, . . . , w}. 2
15
